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I. Introduction 
Proportionality is not a catchword in international law. The canon of well-established general 
principles of law applicable to international law does not generally include proportionality, 
next to equity, the protection of good faith, legitimate expectations or protection from 
retroactive application and other principles generally recognized in domestic law. Equally, 
proportionality has not generally been considered to be part of general principles under 
customary international law next to sovereign equality, self-determination, non-intervention, 
the prohibition of use or threat of force, or permanent sovereignty over natural resources. It 
may achieve such status in the coming years. Its importance is increasing, but the legal status 
in international law is still unclear.1 It remains to be defined whether proportionality operates 
as a self-standing principle in its own right, as forcefully advocated by the late Thomas 
Frank,2 or whether it merely operates in the context of particular fields of international law 
and in different ways. 
The field of human rights protection, spearheaded by the European Court of Human Rights 
applying the European Convention on Human Rights has, ever since its establishment, applied 
considerations of proportionality in assessing restrictions of fundamental rights. The European 
Court of Justice followed suit in applying human rights in its own jurisdiction, assessing the 
lawfulness of European Union law. In European law, the concept of proportionality ‘implies a 
means-ends relationship between the aims pursued by a specific action of the government and 
the means employed to achieve this end’.3 The same, albeit to a lesser extent, holds true for 
protection under the United Nations Human Rights Council and its bodies. Restrictions of 
human rights are assessed on a case by case basis without expressly employing a 
comprehensive doctrine of proportionality in state practice.4  
It is clearly in the protection of fundamental rights where the traditions of proportionality 
developed in administrative law and, subsequently, constitutional law in continental Europe. It 
is from here that proportionality found its way into European and public international law, and 
back from there into domestic law. Human rights protection amounts to the epitome of 
constitutionalization of public international law as patterns of domestic, administrative and 
constitutional law were adjusted and translated to become applicable to the law of 
international relations.5 In the field of human rights, the doctrine of multilevel or multilayered 
governance allows the drawing of a picture of proportionality being applied on all layers of 
governance in structurally comparable levels. Proportionality has evolved as an important 
ingredient in consistently assessing human rights violations wherever and on whatever level of 
1  Cf. E. Crawford, Proportionality, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. VIII, (2012), at 533.; see for example an analysis of the necessity in the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility in R. D. Sloane, ‘On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law 
of State Responsibility’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 106, no. 3, (2012), pp. 447-508, at 
504-507. 
2  T. M. Franck, ‘On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law’, American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 102, no. 715, (2008), pp. 715-767, and T. M. Franck, ‘Proportionality in 
International Law’, Law & Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 2, (2010), at 229-242. 
3  N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study, Kluwer 
International, London, (1996), at 23-24. 
4  Cf. W. Kälin and J. Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, (2009), passim. 
5  See J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, (2009). 
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governance they occur. Courts regularly apply the principle and its different components in 
this context. Proportionality is being used to assess whether restrictions and measures 
affecting human rights appropriately respond to legitimate public interests. The three-tier test 
of proportionality as developed in general administrative and constitutional law, in particular 
in Germany, may be found to apply in this field: under the principle of suitability, it is 
established whether a specific measure taken by the government is suitable for a legitimate 
government purpose. Under the principle of necessity, the question raised is whether there are 
less intrusive means at hand to achieve the purpose of the measure. The principle of necessity 
requires that no less restrictive measure, which is equally effective, is available. Finally, the 
principle of proportionality stricto sensu evaluates whether a measure is excessive and 
attributes relative weight to each principle involved, therewith taking into account all available 
factors and preventing unreasonable results. ‘The greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or 
detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other’.6 
Responding to proportionality, restrictions therefore need to be suitable and apt and able to 
achieve the goal (Suitability: Zwecktauglichkeit). They need be necessary to achieve such 
goals, not going beyond what is required (Necessity: Erforderlichkeit). Finally, they need to be 
appropriate, balancing the purpose and impact (Proportionality in a narrow sense: 
Zumutbarkeit). 7 The triad, developed in German law, has increasingly influenced perceptions 
in restricting human rights throughout Europe and the world. For example, citizens in the UK 
find an explanation of proportionality newly introduced in common law based on the 
interpretation of the Human Rights Act. According to the latter the means of pursuing a 
legitimate objective shall not be excessive, arbitrary or unfair – ‘You must not use a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut’.8  
The adoption of proportionality on all layers of human rights protection alike does not mean 
that the doctrine is firmly settled and uncontroversial. It is feared that the allegedly objective 
process of weighing and balancing of interests inherent to the three-tier test of 
proportionality9 runs the risk of avoiding important moral and value judgment and eventually 
leads to an erosion of human rights protection.10 But importantly, the methodological debate 
no longer differentiates between domestic and international law in the field of human rights. 
Both levels share common concerns as to how the principle of proportionality affects 
individual rights as well as the regulatory powers of legislators. Both levels share a concern 
for correctly defining the proper role of courts and of proper standards of judicial review.  
While established doctrines of proportionality are mostly applied to international human 
rights similar to domestic law, it is much less clear to what extent proportionality applies to 
other fields in international law. It is unclear to what extent proportionality may be deemed a 
general principle of international law applicable to all fields alike. It is unclear to what extent 
6  R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1986), at 102. 
7  E.g. P. Tschannen, U. Zimmerli and M. Müller, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Third Edition, 
Staempfli, Bern, (2009), at 152.  
8  Interpreting the Human Rights Act, http://www.thevillage.org.uk/hrinterpreting.htm (visited March 8, 
2012). 
9  R. Alexy, ‘The Construction of Constitutional Rights’, Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 4, no 1, 
(2010), at 21-32. 
10  For a comprehensive analysis see J. Christoffersen, Fair Balance, Proportionality, Subsidiarity and 
Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights, Martin Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, (2009); S. 
Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, Jean Monnet Working Paper 09/08, (2009), 
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org (visited March 8, 2012); see also: J. Christoffersen and M. R. Madsen, 
The European Court of Human Rights Between Law and Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
(2011). 
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it applies under different names or in disguise. It is unclear to what extent the same 
methodological problems encountered in the field of fundamental and human rights also 
determine and shape the role of proportionality in other chapters of international law. The 
three-step test entails considerable powers in assessing suitability, necessity and 
appropriateness of state conduct, and it is far from clear whether it is suitable for application 
horizontally to all fields of public international law. The paper therefore seeks to assess the 
role of proportionality in selected areas of public international law other than human rights 
protection. We look into the classical domain of sanctions and reprisals in response to 
violations of international law. We assess the role of proportionality in the law of the sea, in 
the law of multilateral trade regulation of the World Trade Organization and in bilateral 
investment protection. We primarily look into recourse to proportionality by arbitral tribunals 
and courts, seeking evidence. We are interested to learn whether there are differences in 
applying proportionality. We draw appropriate conclusions in assessing the operation of 
proportionality in these different fields of public international law. In particular, we shall 
develop in our conclusions a distinction between horizontal and vertical constellations of legal 
protection which, in our view, assists in explaining differences in recourse to proportionality 
in different fields of public international law and the absence of a general principle of 
proportionality in domestic law and in the special field of international human rights 
protection.  
II. Proportionality in Response to the Use of Force by States 
Under international law, states are obliged to refrain from threatening or using force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any other state in their international 
relations. This obligation is now recognized to constitute a principle of customary 
international law and is universally binding.11 Today the principle is codified in Article 2(4) 
of the Charter of the United Nations. As the principle does not affect the right of a state to 
maintain order within its own jurisdiction, nor to defend itself against unlawful attacks, it has 
been accepted − since the UN Charter was established − that there are three categories of 
‘force’ which may be legitimate. These are: retorsions, reprisals and self-defence.12 Such 
force is employed in a horizontal manner, and it is interesting to observe that state practice 
and arbitration rendered them subject to the principle of proportionality. 
The principle of self-defence is not only an integral part of customary law, but is also stated in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.13 It constitutes the only explicit exception to the basic principle 
of refraining from the threat or use of force. In contrast to retorsion, which is an unfriendly, 
but nonetheless lawful measure, both reprisals and self-defence must fulfil certain 
preconditions to be legitimate. For self-defence these are ‘armed attack’ against a state; the 
11  See N. Stürchler, The Threat of Force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
(2007); M. N. Shaw, International Law, Fifth Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2006), 
at 1018. 
12  E.g. M. N. Shaw (2006) supra note 11, at 1022-1036 for an in-depth analysis of the categories. 
13  ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to 
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.’ 
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core of, and limit to, the right are the concepts of necessity and proportionality.14 It is here 
that the principle finds its locus classicus and point of departure in international law. As 
outlined below it entered international law through the application by international tribunals 
of the principle of equity. 
A. Proportionality in the Resort to Force and Self-Defence (Jus ad Bellum) 
In the Naulilaa Arbitration between Portugal and Germany in 1928,15 for the first time a 
Tribunal held that there was no applicable law of nations dealing with the legitimacy of 
reprisals of states and therefore decided to fill the gap by consulting the principles of equity in 
analogy: 
Enfin, à défaut de règles du droit des gens applicables aux faits 
litigieux, les arbitres estiment devoir combler la lacune, en 
statuant suivant les principes d'équité, tout en restant dans le 
sens du droit des gens, appliqué par analogie, et en tenant 
compte de son évolution.16 
The next step taken by the Tribunal was to give a classic definition of reprisals and the 
various elements to be taken into account. A reprisal is a lawful act of self-defence of an 
injured state only if it takes place in response to a prior violation of international law, and 
after peaceful negotiations have been unsuccessful. It is bordered by experiences of humanity 
and the rules of good faith applicable in relations between states. It would be illegal without 
such prior violation of international law.17 This definition, however, does not specify whether 
the act of self-defence needs to be proportionate to the original unlawful act or not. A 
prohibition of abuse of the right was introduced, taking into account the experience of World 
War I. The Tribunal decided that even if proportionality to the original unlawful act was not 
required by the law of nations, reprisals should certainly be considered as excessive and 
therefore unlawful when they are out of all proportion to the act that motivates them.18 In 
conclusion, the Tribunal found that the German raid on Angola, which had been provoked by 
the mistaken killing of three Germans, was not a proportionate response and that no attempts 
at peaceful negotiations had preceded it. The reprisal was therefore found to be unlawful.19 
The International Court of Justice (hereinafter, the ICJ) dealt with the question of self-defence 
for the first time in 1986 in the Nicaragua case.20 Before examining the concrete measures at 
hand the Court stated that the ‘Parties also agree in holding that whether the response to the 
attack is lawful depends on observance of the criteria of the necessity and the proportionality 
14  See e.g. M. N. Shaw (2006), supra note 11, at 1031. There is still no consensus on pre-emptive self-
defence, while some consider it possible if an armed attack has been imminent and unavoidable. See 
e.g. M. N. Shaw (2006), supra note 11, at 1028-1030; A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided 
World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1986), at 230 et seq. 
15  Responsabilité de L’Allemagne a Raison des Dommages Causés dans les Colonies Portugaises du Sud 
de L’Afrique, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409 (1928) (Portugal v. Germany) (The Naulilaa Arbitration), 
reprinted in 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1011 (1949). 
16  Ibid., at 1016. 
17  Ibid., at 1026. 
18  Ibid.  
19  Ibid., at 1028. 
20  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). 
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, at 14; See also a detailed account by T. M. Franck (2010), supra 
note 2. 
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of the measures taken in self-defence.’21 First the Court pointed out that US assistance to the 
‘contras’ as well as the mining of Nicaraguan ports and attacks on ports, oil installations and 
more by the US had been unlawful because there had been no armed attack on the part of 
Nicaragua against El Salvador. It nonetheless continued to examine whether the US measures 
would have been deemed necessary and proportionate, had they been lawful in the first place. 
The Court noted that the US actions took place several months after the opposition against the 
government of El Salvador was stopped.22 Thus the component of necessity was absent in this 
case. On the issue of proportionality the Court stated the following: 
237 … Whatever uncertainty may exist as to the exact scale of 
the aid received by the Salvadorian armed opposition from 
Nicaragua, it is clear that these latter United States activities in 
question could not have been proportionate to that aid. Finally 
on this point, the Court must also observe that the reaction of the 
United States in the context of what it regarded as self-defence 
was continued long after the period in which any presumed 
armed attack by Nicaragua could reasonably be contemplated. 
The Court summarized its findings that the ‘acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even 
assuming them to have been established by and imputable to that State, could only have 
justified proportionate counter-measures on the part of the State which had been the victim of 
these acts, namely El Salvador, Honduras or Costa Rica. They could not justify counter-
measures taken by a third State, the United States, and particularly could not justify 
intervention involving the use of force.’23 
In 2005 the Democratic Republic of Congo claimed to have been attacked by armed Ugandan 
forces in the Congo case.24 Uganda on the other hand pleaded self-defence against attacks 
from the Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADF). As the Court was 
not satisfied that any attack had emanated from armed forces of the Congo, it denied Uganda 
the right of self-defence. It once again seized the opportunity of observing that the measures 
taken would neither seem proportionate nor necessary: 
147. For all these reasons, the Court finds that the legal and 
factual circumstances for the exercise of a right of self-defence 
by Uganda against the DRC were not present. […] The Court 
cannot fail to observe, however, that the taking of airports and 
towns many hundreds of kilometres from Uganda’s border 
would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks 
it claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be 
necessary to that end. 
In the case law of the ICJ, self-defence is clearly restricted to measures that are necessary and 
proportionate. To qualify as necessary, an armed attack from a state must have taken place 
21  Nicaragua, supra note 20, para. 194. 
22  Nicaragua, supra note, 20, para. 237. 
23  Nicaragua, supra note, 20, para. 249. In addition to the already mentioned preconditions for self-
defence, the collective self-defence rests upon two additional criteria – explicit declaration by the state-
victim about an armed attack and assistance request directed to a third state, which were not met in this 
case, – see Nicaragua, supra note, 20, paras. 195-199. 
24  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, at 168. 
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and to qualify as proportionate, the self-defence should not exceed what is necessary to fend 
off the attack. The rights of the Security Council to take measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security remain reserved.25  
In conclusion, it is well established in case law that the right to self-defence is subject to the 
principle of necessity and proportionality. This was explicitly recognized by the ICJ. Upon 
request of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the ICJ rendered an Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in July 1996.26 After clarifying that 
the UN Charter is ‘the most directly relevant applicable law’,27 it reiterated that ‘[t]he 
submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the conditions of necessity and 
proportionality is a rule of customary international law.’28  
B. Proportionality in the Conduct of War (Jus in Bello) 
In the law of warfare, enforcing self-defence, the principle of proportionality aims, on the one 
hand, at prohibiting the use of certain weapons which are particularly destructive and, on the 
other hand, at limiting the harm done by weapons that are not prohibited. 
The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
found that the proportionality principle did not in itself exclude the use of nuclear weapons in 
all circumstances. It did however emphasize that a use of force which is proportionate under 
the law of self-defence, ‘must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law 
applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law.’29 According to the Court, the first principle is based on the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants, aiming at the protection of the civilian population. 
The civilian population is never to be an object of attack, and the use of weapons that cannot 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants is banned. The second principle 
prohibits causing unnecessary suffering to combatants and civilians. The prohibition of 
weapons that do not meet these requirements of humanitarian law can thus be seen as a 
reflection of the principle of proportionality. After a detailed examination of humanitarian 
law, however, the Court was unable to ‘reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or 
illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, 
in which its very survival would be at stake.’30 
In 2003, in the Oil Platforms31 case, the ICJ again reaffirmed the requirement of necessity and 
proportionality. Only an armed attack in the responsibility of a state makes a measure of self-
defence necessary, and even then, this measure needs to be proportional to the armed attack in 
terms of means and timing. In the case at hand, the US launched a sequence of military action 
against Iranian vessels and aircraft. This action was found to be disproportionate to the 
damage suffered by a US vessel in the Persian Gulf. 
25  Article 51 UN Charter. 
26  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, at 226. 
27  Ibid., para. 34. 
28  Ibid., para. 41. 
29  Ibid., para. 42. 
30  Ibid., para. 97. 
31  Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, at 
161. 
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77. [...] As a response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, 
of a single United States warship, which was severely damaged 
but not sunk, and without loss of life, neither “Operation 
Praying Mantis” as a whole, nor even that part of it that 
destroyed the Salman and Nasr platforms, can be regarded, in 
the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of force in 
self-defence. 
In conclusion, the classical body of international law in the fields of self-defence, armed 
intervention and warfare essentially focuses, founded upon equity, on the principle of 
necessity, assessing the relationship of means as applied to achieve a particular and lawful 
end, taking into account the principles of humanitarian law. Proportionality as recognised by 
the ICJ as a principle of customary law does not entail an assessment of suitability and an 
overall balance of interests at stake in this field of public international law.  
III. Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation  
One particular aspect of territorial sovereignty of states − against which states are obliged to 
refrain from threatening or using force − is maritime boundary delimitation.32 As delimitation 
generally affects more than one state, the delimitation must be based on peaceful settlement 
among all the states involved. In cases where they are unable to arrive at an agreement, courts 
must be called upon. Again, equity was at the heart of introducing considerations of 
proportionality in allocating marine spaces to coastal states, entailing the employment of 
criteria and relevant factors.  
A. Foundations  
In 1969, in the North Sea Continental Shelf33 cases, the ICJ was requested to state the rules 
and principles of international law applicable in a dispute related to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf.34 The Court decided two cases in a single judgment, one between Germany 
and the Netherlands and the other between Germany and Denmark. Most of the delimitation 
had been agreed upon by the parties. The court had to choose between the equidistance 
principle (supported by Denmark and the Netherlands) or proportionality to the coastline 
(Germany) in order to set the rest of the boundaries.35 
After having come to the conclusion that the parties were under no obligation to apply the 
equidistance principle, neither under treaty nor customary law,36 the Court contended that the 
32  For a detailed study on the law of the sea, see e.g. M. N. Shaw (2006), supra note 11, at 490-568. 
33  North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, at 3. 
34  More recent works on this extensive and complex subject include R. Kolb, Case Law on Equitable 
Maritime Delimitation/Jurisprudence sur les délimitations maritimes selon l'équité, Digest and 
Commentaries/Répertoire et commentaries, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, (2003); M. Antunes, 
Towards the Conceptualisation of Maritime Delimitation, Legal and Technical Aspects of a Political 
Process, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, (2003); J. Shi, ‘Maritime Delimitation in the 
Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 2, 
(2010), pp. 271-291; T. Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: Legal 
Foundations and Methodology, (forthcoming 2013). 
35  North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 33, para. 7. 
36  Ibid., para. 83. 
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parties were obliged to take all of the circumstances in the particular case into account and to 
act in such a way that the equitable principles were applied,37 and therefore decided: 
(D) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be taken into 
account are to include: …  
(3) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which 
a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable 
principles ought to bring about between the extent of the 
continental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal State and the 
length of its Coast measured in the general direction of the 
coastline, account being taken for this purpose of the effects, 
actual or prospective, of any other continental shelf 
delimitations between adjacent States in the same region.38 
B. Controlling for Disproportionate Allocations  
Ten years later, in the Anglo-French Continental cases,39 the Court of Arbitration stated even 
more precisely that it did not consider proportionality to be a general principle to be applied in 
all cases. It recognized that in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases there was a peculiar 
geographical situation, while:  
99. … In the present case, the role of proportionality in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf is, in the view of this Court, 
a broader one, not linked to any specific geographical feature. It 
is rather a factor to be taken into account in appreciating the 
effects of geographical features on the equitable or inequitable 
character of a delimitation and in particular of a delimitation by 
application of the equidistance method. 
The Court continued to state that the concept of proportionality plays a particular role in the 
situations of ‘particular configurations of the coast or individual geographical features’.  
100. … The concept of “proportionality” merely expresses the 
criterion or factor by which it may be determined whether such a 
distortion results in an inequitable delimitation of the continental 
shelf as between the coastal States concerned. The factor of 
proportionality may appear in the form of the ratio between the 
areas of continental shelf to the lengths of the respective 
coastlines, as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. But it 
may also appear, and more usually does, as a factor for 
determining the reasonable or unreasonable − the equitable or 
inequitable − effects of particular geographical features or 
configurations upon the course of an equidistance-line 
boundary. 
37  Ibid., para. 93-99. 
38  Ibid., para. 101. 
39  Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration (1979) 18 ILM at 379-494. 
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101. In short, it is disproportion rather than any general principle 
of proportionality which is the relevant criterion or factor. 
The Court specified that it was more a question of remedying 
disproportionality and inequitable effects produced by particular geographical 
configurations or features, and that the concept of proportionality was not to be 
used ‘as a general principle providing an independent source of rights to areas 
of continental shelf’.40 
Recourse to proportionality – or rather disproportionality – was further developed in a 
subsequent case of the ICJ and in arbitration. The 2009 Case Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine)41 offers a succinct summary of the case law at hand and 
recalls that proportionality merely applies to avoid gross inequities and does not entail a 
mathematical application of a principle. Upon reviewing a number of precedents, the Court 
recalled in particular the findings of the Chamber in the 1984 Gulf of Maine Case, which 
confirmed that the equitable principles ‘may be taken into consideration for an international 
maritime delimitation’ in cases of certain geographical inequalities.42 Finally, the Chamber 
stated: 
167. [...] The Chamber’s views on this subject may be summed 
up by observing that a maritime delimitation can certainly not be 
established by a direct division of the area in dispute 
proportional to the respective lengths of the coasts belonging to 
the parties in the relevant area, but it is equally certain that a 
substantial disproportion to the lengths of those coasts that 
resulted from a delimitation effected on a different basis would 
constitute a circumstance calling for an appropriate correction. 
(Ibid., p. 323, para. 185; emphasis added.) 
These cases demonstrate how the ICJ and arbitration tribunals developed their jurisprudence 
in the field of maritime delimitation based upon the equitable principles. The ICJ developed a 
multi-step examination, the result of which is subject to a disproportionality check. Firstly, the 
Court ascertains that the states concerned have not themselves been able to come to an 
agreement. Secondly, it determines the relevant coasts and base points to be used, and as a 
rule establishes a provisional equidistance. Thirdly, the Court takes all relevant circumstances 
into consideration before it decides whether the provisionally drawn line needs to be 
modified. Finally the Court verifies ex post, whether the result ‘does not lead to any 
significant disproportionality by reference to the respective coastal lengths and the 
apportionment of areas that ensue.’43 
In conclusion, proportionality in maritime boundary delimitation assumes a particular and 
succinct function in this field of natural resource allocation. Consideration of suitability and 
necessity are absent from the test. The focus is on broadly assessing whether the results 
achieved are equitable and not disproportionate in relation to coastal configurations and the 
landmass of coastal states.  
40  Ibid., para. 101. 
41  Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 2009 p. 61. 
42  Ibid., para. 167. 
43  Ibid., para. 210. 
12 
                                                 
IV.  Proportionality in WTO Law 
WTO law does not explicitly operate on the basis of proportionality, but contains several 
indirect references, generally expressed in terms like ‘necessary to’ or ‘least trade restrictive’, 
or ‘appropriate’ measures. Such terms illustrate the inherent presence of some kind of 
proportionality in WTO law by reference to balancing and weighing of measures or interests. 
References to proportionality come in the form of three versions of obligations: (i) public 
policy exceptions (Article XX General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article 
XIV General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which require a certain degree of 
weighing in order to establish whether or not a divergence from WTO obligations is 
legitimate, and (ii) positive obligations (e.g. in the SPS and the TBT Agreement), which 
commit Members to conduct a careful balancing or weighing test before implementing a 
specific measure. Finally (iii), proportionality can be observed in the context of suspension of 
concessions in enforcing WTO law under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  
Against this background we turn to the analysis of proportionality in WTO law. Three steps of 
the proportionality principle can be identified: (i) the characterization of a causal link between 
the measures attacked and the policy aim justifying the exception; (ii) the requirement of 
least-possible effect on international trade taking into consideration the policy aim; (iii) a 
balance estimate of the proportionality of the measure.44 The following paragraphs illustrate 
different references and how the Appellate Body and Members have interpreted them.45 
Given the prominence of proportionality in the law of reprisals and countermeasures 
discussed above, we begin with implementation and enforcement of WTO dispute settlement 
decisions, and then turn to substantive law within the GATT and the GATS.  
A. Countermeasures in WTO law 
In the DSU, proportionality is relevant for the establishment of a penalty or countermeasure: 
‘The level of the suspension of the concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB 
shall be equivalent of the level of nullification or impairment’.46 Thus, in every dispute where 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decides upon compensation and suspension of 
concessions, a test weighing the gravity of the injury of the different measures at stake has to 
be conducted. The establishment of the right measures, thus, mainly consists of considerations 
of proportionality. 
In EC-Bananas III the arbitrators established that the DSU rules on countermeasures have to 
be interpreted in a way that avoids conflict with customary international law:  
44  See generally M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig‚ ‘Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective’, 
Texas International Law Journal, vol. 42, no. 3, (2007), 371-427; N. Diebold, Non-discrimination in 
International Trade in Services: ‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2010. 
45  For an overview of WTO provisions, which may incorporate proportionality see A. D. Mitchell, Legal 
Principles in WTO Disputes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2008), at 178-181; and on the 
necessity element see a more recent article: A. D. Mitchell and C. Henckels, ‘Variations on a Theme: 
Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment and WTO Law’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming, 2013), available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2157250 (visited October 4, 2012), at 42-43. 
46  Article 22.4 DSU. 
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Moreover, such cumulative compensation or cumulative 
suspension of concessions by different WTO Members for the 
same amount of nullification or impairment would run counter 
to the general international law principle of proportionality of 
countermeasures.47 
Thus, the penalty should not be disproportionate to the harm caused.48 However, in deviation 
from customary international law, the gravity of a wrongful act is subordinate in WTO law. 
Rather, WTO law imposes a restriction on the punitive character of countermeasures by 
requiring that such measures must be ‘equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment’. 
The focus is thus on the gravity of the injury, and not on the gravity of the wrongful act.49 
Mitchell argues that if the principle of proportionality were considered thoroughly, the degree 
of culpability would have to be taken into consideration when establishing whether or not a 
penalty or countermeasure is disproportionate. However, this has so far not been the case.50 
In US-Cotton Yarn, the Appellate Body referred to customary international law in refuting the 
concept of punitive damages in WTO law:  
Our view is supported further by the rules of general 
international law on state responsibility, which require that 
countermeasures in response to breaches by states of their 
international obligations be commensurate with the injury 
suffered. In the same vein, we note that Article 22.4 of the DSU 
stipulates that the suspension of concessions shall be equivalent 
to the level of nullification or impairment. This provision of the 
DSU has been interpreted consistently as not justifying punitive 
damages. These two examples illustrate the consequences of 
breaches by states of their international obligations, whereas a 
safeguard action is merely a remedy to WTO-consistent "fair 
trade" activity. It would be absurd if the breach of an 
international obligation were sanctioned by proportionate 
countermeasures, while, in the absence of such breach, a WTO 
Member would be subject to a disproportionate and, hence, 
"punitive", attribution of serious damage not wholly caused by 
its exports. In our view, such an exorbitant derogation from the 
principle of proportionality in respect of the attribution of 
serious damage could be justified only if the drafters of the ATC 
had expressly provided for it, which is not the case.51 
In the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), the language concerning 
countermeasures is somewhat different to the DSU: While the DSU requires countermeasures 
to be ‘equivalent’ to the injury, countermeasures must be ‘appropriate’52 in respect to 
47  EC-Bananas III, WT/DS27/ARB (April 9 1999), para. 6.16. 
48  A. D. Mitchell, ‘Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes’, The European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 17, no. 5, (2007), 985-1008, at 999. 
49  A. Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 4, no. 3, 
(2001), 441-480, at 448. 
50  A. D. Mitchell (2007), supra note 48, at 1001-4. 
51  United States-Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, 
WT/DS192/AB/R (October 8 2001), para. 120, footnotes omitted.  
52  Articles 4.10 and 4.11 SCM Agreement. 
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prohibited subsidies and ‘commensurate’53 referring to actionable subsidies under the SCM 
Agreement.54 Footnotes 9 and 10 of the SCM Agreement clarify that the reference to 
‘appropriate’ ‘is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in the light of 
the fact that the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited’. These are the only 
two explicit references to proportionality in WTO law. 
In Brazil-Aircraft arbitrators further elaborated the term ‘appropriate’ under the SCM 
Agreement and came to the conclusion that the SCM Agreement does not require 
countermeasures to be equivalent to the injury and, thus, they may go beyond 
countermeasures under the DSU. In order to establish ‘appropriate’ countermeasures by 
including all possibilities at hand, the Panel will increasingly have to include proportionality 
in its considerations: 
[…] [W]e note that footnotes 9 and 10 at least confirm that the 
term "appropriate" in Articles 4.10 and 4.11 of the SCM 
Agreement should not be given the same meaning as the term 
"equivalent" in Article 22 of the DSU.55  
[…] [W]e recall that the concept of nullification or impairment 
is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement. In that 
framework, there is no legal obligation that countermeasures in 
the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations be 
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.56 
B. Competing Legitimate Policy Goals: Exceptions in GATT and GATS  
Article XX GATT states the conditions for exemptions from GATT regulation. Panels and the 
Appellate Body use a three-step analysis. They first examine whether the policy measures is 
covered by one of the motives listed. Secondly, they assess whether the required test of 
necessity or relatedness is fulfilled. Thirdly, they establish whether the measure complies with 
the chapeau of the provision. The same methodology applies to Article XIV GATS.57 First, 
the measure needs to be justified under the specific provisions of the Article. However, GATS 
Article XIV only provides for a single degree of connection, i.e., ‘necessary to’, while GATT 
Article XX differentiates between ‘necessary to’ and ‘relating to’. The latter is of paramount 
importance in defining the relationship of trade and the environment.58 Elements of 
53  Ibid.  
54  A. Desmedt (2001), supra note 49, at 451. 
55  Brazil-Aircraft, WT/DS46/ARB (August 28 2000), para. 3.51. 
56  Brazil-Aircraft, supra note 55, para. 3.57. 
57  United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (April 7 2005), para. 292; See also J. Trachtman, ‘International Decisions – United 
States: Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Betting and Gambling Services’, American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 99, no. 4, (2005), 861-867, at 864; Committee on Trade and 
Environment, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and 
(g) of GATT, Note by the Secretariat, Revision, WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1 (October 26 1998), para. 10. See 
generally for the three-step test, T. Cottier and M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation, Cameron 
May and Staempfli, Bern and London, (2005), at 429. For a criticism of the utility of the approach see 
P. Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, (2005), at 213. 
58  T. Cottier, P. Delimatsis and N. Diebold, ‘Article XIV GATS: General Exceptions’, in R. Wolfrum, P-
T. Stoll and C. Feinäugle (eds.), Trade in Services, Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden and Boston, vol. 6, (2008), 287-328, at 292.  
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proportionality can be found in both of the steps for assessing exemptions to GATT and 
GATS. The relationship of proportionality to necessity, however, is not settled. It is unclear 
whether necessity in WTO entails, in essence, an analysis amounting to a three-step 
proportionality principle, whether it goes beyond it or falls short of it. Andenas and Zleptnig 
consider the different tests embodied in Article XX GATT – when taken together – to be 
‘more refined and structured’ than the proportionality analysis in the same test in EC law, 
Interstate U.S. law or general public international law.59 We first assess the relevance of the 
chapeau provisions for proportionality.  
1. CHAPEAU  
The Chapeau of Article XX GATT states that given that such measures ‘are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or a 
‘disguised restriction in international trade’, GATT shall not prevent domestic measures 
which serve a specific objective of general interest,60 like the protection of public morals. 
Several terms (e.g. ‘unjustifiable’, ‘arbitrary’ or ‘necessary’) in Article XX GATT require 
weighing and balancing along the lines of the proportionality principle. Article XIV GATS is 
the services equivalent of GATT Article XX. Accordingly, it shows similarities in the 
application of proportionality.61 
In US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body’s interpretation of the weighing and balancing test in the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT comes very close to the principle of proportionality, which is 
referred to as ‘a line of equilibrium’. This line shall not cancel out the competing rights and 
thus shall not distort the balance between the rights and obligations reached by the Members 
in GATT. Since the factual circumstances vary, the equilibrium is determined on a case-by-
case basis.62 
The chapeau of GATT XX indicates that invoking an exception to GATT requires the 
application of measures in a reasonable manner, taking into account national rights, but also 
the rights of other Members of the GATT. This act of balancing will ultimately determine 
whether a measure is arbitrary, unjustifiable or constitutes a disguised restriction on 
international trade. This process closely resembles a proportionality analysis. Thus, within the 
scope of Article XX GATT and Article XIV GATS, proportionality ‘can be seen as a 
governing principle and flexible tool to guide judicial inquiry into lawfulness of domestic 
measures’.63 Essentially, it is a guarantee against the abuse of rights which in turn is founded 
in equity.64 
59  M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig (2007), supra note 44, at 415-6. 
60  Chapeau of GATT XX. 
61  The prudential carve-out in paragraph two of the Annex on Financial Services could also be potentially 
affected, see C. Kaufmann and R. H. Weber, ‘Reconciling Liberalized Trade in Financial Services and 
Domestic Regulation,’ in K. Alexander and M. Andenas (eds.), The World Trade Organisation and 
Trade in Services, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, (2008), at 411-427. 
62  US-Shrimps, WT/DS58/AB/R (October 12 1998), para. 159. 
63  M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig (2007), supra note 44, at 415. 
64  US-Shrimps, supra note 62, para. 158. ‘The Chapeau of Article XX is, in fact, but one expression of the 
principle of good faith. The principle, at once a principle of law and a general principle of international 
law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the application 
widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and 
enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right ‘impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it 
must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably’ (footnotes omitted). See generally M. Panizzon, 
Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO, Hart, Oxford and Portland, (2006).  
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2. THE NECESSITY TEST 
The necessity test in Article XX GATT evolved from the Korea-Beef and EC-Asbestos 
cases.65 It consists of a three-step analysis which takes up the three elements of the principle 
of proportionality identified at the outset: (i) Is the measure suitable to achieve the goal? (ii) is 
the measure necessary or are there less trade restrictive measures available to achieve the 
same goal? and (iii) It requires ‘a process of weighing and balancing’ 
[…] a series of factors which prominently include the 
contribution made by the compliance measure to the 
enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of 
the common interests or values protected by that law or 
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or 
regulation on imports or exports.66 
In Korea-Beef, the first case to deal with the issue, the Appellate Body stressed that a process 
of weighing and balancing contributes to determining whether a Member can reasonably be 
expected to employ an alternative measure, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is 
reasonably available.67 Thus, it might seem that step three of the necessity test constitutes 
some kind of proportionality test. However, it is also argued that the third step merely 
suggests that all the relevant factors must be taken into account in the analysis of the necessity 
of a given measure.68 
The EC-Asbestos case refined the necessity requirement, stating that: ‘in determining whether 
a suggested alternative measure is “reasonably available”, several factors must be taken into 
account, besides the difficulty of implementation’.69 Based on Korea-Beef, the main factors 
that need to be taken into account are: (i) the extent to which the alternative measure 
contributes to the realization of the end pursued, and (ii) the importance of the interests and 
values pursued by the Member.70 Furthermore, two important cases from the 1990s 
considered necessity under Article XX(d) GATT. Both Thailand-Cigarettes71 and US-
Gasoline72 confirmed that the measure consistent or less inconsistent with the WTO law shall 
be reasonably available in achieving legitimate objectives. 
The main case that covers proportionality-related matters in the GATS is US-Gambling.73 It 
presents a definition of the necessity condition equivalent to the one presented in Korea-Beef 
under GATT Article XX.74 Consequently, both the cost-benefit balancing test and the two-tier 
test are applied similarly and controlled against a ‘less-restrictive alternative’ test. 
65  EC-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135(AB/R (March 12 
2001). 
66  Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (December 11 
2000), para. 164. 
67  Ibid., para. 166. 
68  S. Thomas, ‘Trade and Environment under WTO rules after the Appellate Body Report in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres’, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, vol. 4, no. 1, (2009), pp. 
42-49, at 46. 
69  EC-Asbestos, supra note 65, para. 170.  
70  M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig (2007), supra note 44, at 411. 
71  Thailand-Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R – 37S/200 
(November 7 1990), para. 75. 
72  US-Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (January 29 1996), para. 6.25. 
73  US-Gambling, supra note 57. 
74  Ibid., para. 305.  
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In US-Gambling, the AB reiterated the reasoning developed in Korea-Beef in that the 
‘necessary’ condition should be determined through ‘a process of weighing and balancing a 
series of factors.’75 First the ‘relative importance’76 of the interests or values furthered by the 
challenged measures shall be assessed. In the same way as in the application of GATT Article 
XX, even if a less-restrictive measure is available, WTO Members may not be required to use 
it if its administrative or enforcement costs are excessive.77 The report also stated that a 
measure that preserves the responding party’s right to achieve its desired level of protection 
(with respect to GATS Article XIV(a)) is a ‘reasonably available’ alternative measure.78 
Some commentators have noted that, similarly to GATT Article XX, the application of the 
balancing test by the AB is self-contradictory.79  
The US-Gambling approach has been followed by the AB in China-Audiovisuals.80 The AB 
clarified that the respondent bears the burden of proof to show that the chosen inconsistent 
measure is ‘necessary’. Only when the complainant suggests an alternative measure, must the 
respondent show why ‘the proposed alternative is not genuine or is not “reasonably available” 
to confirm that the original measure is necessary’.81 China-Audiovisuals was the first case 
ever where the Appellate Body accepted the existence of less intrusive measures as proposed 
by the complaining party, obliging China to change its legislation on censorship. 
The necessity test post-Korea-Beef thus resembles proportionality analysis so much that 
scholars have considered the principle of proportionality to belong to prominent principles in 
WTO law, based on examples of the necessity test.82 However, the majority of WTO lawyers 
do not agree that the necessity test and proportionality analysis are equivalent. The focus on 
least trade-restrictive measures has caused some criticism in academic literature, mainly 
because it imposes too many constraints on legitimate domestic policy choices. In the 
interpretation of Andenas and Zleptnig, the judicial development of the necessity test in WTO 
law has evolved from a least trade-restrictive approach, to a less trade-restrictive one, 
supplemented by a proportionality test. In sum, the necessity test introduces the possibility of 
flexible balancing into Article XX GATT (and Article XIV GATS) and a ‘certain degree of 
subjectivity on the part of the judiciary’.83 
3. THE COST-BENEFIT BALANCING TEST 
Brazil-Retreaded Tyres constitutes a turning point for the necessity test and for 
proportionality: the panel report suggests that the necessity of a measure may depend on the 
character of the goal it pursues,84 and the report of the Appellate Body appears to entrench for 
the first time the need for a panel to take the importance of a regulatory goal into 
75  Ibid., para. 305. 
76  Ibid., para. 306. 
77  Ibid., para. 308. 
78  Ibid. 
79  See for instance D. H. Regan, ‘The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article 
XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing’, World Trade Review, vol. 6, no. 3, (2007), 347-369. 
80  China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R (21 December 2009), para. 319. 
81  US-Gambling, supra note 57, paras. 309-311. 
82  See e.g. T. M. Franck (2010), supra note 2, at 237. 
83  M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig (2007), supra note 44, at 411-12. 
84  Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (December 3 2007) para. 
7.104. 
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consideration.85 The report also recognizes that two measures may be cumulative,86 which 
increases the chance that the measures are considered necessary in the future. The Appellate 
Body emphasized that:  
a panel must assess all the relevant factors, particularly the 
extent of the contribution to the achievement of a measure’s 
objective and its trade restrictiveness, in the light of the 
importance of the interests or values at stake.87 
Thus, the Appellate Body introduced a consideration of the importance of the policy goal of a 
measure in the context of necessity analysis. For many, this represents a step backwards, as it 
is considered inappropriate for panels to examine the importance of a regulatory goal, and 
because there is no methodology to guide the panels in their examination.88 Brazil-Retreaded 
Tyres has been criticized – among other things – for granting panels too much discretion with 
respect to determining the value of a specific national policy goal.89 At the same time, it 
constitutes a step towards a full proportionality test within the WTO framework, as it adds the 
kind of balancing and weighing of a goal, which was missing until then, and which 
distinguishes the necessity from the proportionality test. Nonetheless, doubts persist as to 
whether the DSB of the WTO is entitled to conduct such balancing and weighing of interests 
to the extent of proportionality stricto sensu for reasons indicated above. 
C. Safeguard Measures  
Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards establishes that a safeguard measure is to be 
applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy a serious injury90 and to facilitate 
adjustment. The main purpose of the proportionality principle is to minimize the trade-
distortive effects of safeguards by setting the maximum economic extent to which such 
actions may be applied.91 The locution ‘to the extent necessary’ covers both the elements of 
suitability and the least-trade restrictiveness. Moreover, the measure has to be necessary ‘to 
prevent or remedy’, in other words, to correct or preclude serious injury to the importing 
country that produces like or competing products. The test, subject to more detailed provision 
on quantitative restrictions, is comparable to criteria applicable under Article XX GATT, and 
which relate to the principle of proportionality in similar ways. However, no disciplines on 
safeguards have so far emerged under GATS. 
85  Ibid., paras. 156 and 210. 
86  Ibid., para. 7.169. 
87  Ibid., para . 156. 
88  See e.g. B. McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and 
Cumulative Regulatory Measures’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 12, no. 1, (2008), 153-
173, at 163. 
89  Ibid., at 173; C. P. Brown and J. P. Trachtmann, ‘Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres: A Balancing Act’, World Trade Review, vol. 8, no. 1, (2009), 85-135; and on WTO adjudication 
P. Eeckhout, ‘The Scales of Trade – Reflections on the Growth and Functions of the WTO Adjudicative 
Branch’, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 13, no. 1, (2010), 3-26. 
90  For a definition of ‘serious injury’, see Art. 4.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards. 
91  Y. S. Lee, Safeguard Measures in World Trade: The Legal Analysis, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, (2005), at 96. 
19 
                                                 
D. TBT and SPS Agreements 
The main standards in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) are that domestic 
measures shall pursue an accepted public policy objective and that they are no more trade-
restrictive than necessary. This involves a process of balancing and weighing ‘aiming to 
ensure that the obstacles to international trade are not disproportionate or excessive to the 
objectives pursued by the Members’.92 
In the SPS Agreement, such a domestic measure must be (i) ‘necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health’93 (while the word ‘necessary’ includes an obligation to show a 
causal link between the measure and the aim), and (ii) it must be rationally connected to an 
obligatory risk assessment94 (the rational connection relates to the risk at stake and not to the 
aim pursued).95 Furthermore, the domestic measure shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
necessary ‘to achieve [the] appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking 
into account technical and economic feasibility.’96 
Relating to Article 5.6 SPS Agreement, Australia-Salmon established a three-step test to 
assess an alternative SPS measure, which: (i) is reasonably available taking technical and 
economic feasibility into account, (ii) achieves the Member’s appropriate level of sanitary and 
phytosanitary protection, and (iii) is significantly less restrictive to trade than the contested 
SPS measure.97 Mitchell suggests that this necessity test is comparable to the one used under 
GATT Article XX and may be considered as part of the general principle of proportionality. 
However, the emphasis on ‘significantly’ constitutes a slight shift in the standard, which may 
be seen as a proportionality tailored to the needs and logic of WTO law.98 According to 
Mitchell the TBT Agreement gives WTO dispute settlement bodies greater scope to account 
for proportionality than the GATT and the SPS Agreement.99 Based on Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement, EC-Sardines established that WTO tribunals need to decide whether a Member’s 
objective is legitimate, as well as whether it is suitable and necessary to achieve that 
objective.100 
U.S. – COOL and U.S. - Tuna II (Mexico), extensively addressed the issue of legitimacy. 
Firstly, it was confirmed that the legitimate objectives are not limited to an open list in Article 
2.2 TBT Agreement. The panel in U.S. – COOL stated that there is no requirement that an 
objective pursued by a WTO Member State must be ‘linked in nature’ to those explicitly 
mentioned in Article 2.2 TBT Agreement. Although Canada objected to it, this approach not 
to apply the ejusdem generis principle was confirmed by the Appellate Body.101 With the 
reference to U.S. – Tuna II (Mexico) the Appellate Body recalled that the preamble of the 
92  A. Desmedt (2001), supra note 49, at 424.  
93  Article 2.1 SPS Agreement. 
94  Article 5.1 SPS Agreement. 
95  A. Desmedt (2001), supra note 49, at 455. 
96  Article 5.6 SPS Agreement. 
97  Australia-Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (October 20 1998), para. 180. 
98  A. D. Mitchell (2008), supra note 45, at 201. 
99  Ibid., at 202. 
100  EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (September 26 2002), para. 286. 
101  U.S. – COOL, WT/DS384/AB/R; WT/DS386/AB/R (29 June 2012), para. 453. 
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TBT Agreement, as well as other covered agreements may serve as a useful guidance or a 
source of information for the panel in determining what is ‘legitimate’.102 
In US-Clove Cigarettes the Panel suggested that GATT jurisprudence is relevant for the 
analysis of ‘necessity’, however, it does not suggest that it shall be applied in its entirety to 
the interpretation of Article 2.2 TBT Agreement.103 This approach was later supported by the 
panels and the Appellate Body in the US-Tuna II (Mexico) and US-COOL cases.104 The 
practice developed by the panels and the Appellate Body in cases on Article 2.2 TBT 
Agreement suggests that the necessity analysis is a ‘relational analysis of the trade 
restrictiveness’ based on assessment of the following factors.105 First, the panels need to 
consider: (i) trade restrictiveness of technical regulation; (ii) fulfilment of the objective 
pursued at the level chosen by a Member, which does not entail any minimum threshold and 
simply refers to a ‘degree of contribution to the achievement of objective’,106 and, finally, (iii) 
the risks of non-fulfilment, with due regard to the importance of the interests and values at 
stake. It should be noted that the wording of Article 2.2 TBT allows for some trade-
restrictiveness of the technical regulation, which, however, shall not constitute an unnecessary 
obstacle to trade.107 A positive obligation to ensure the proportionality of trade-restrictiveness 
differentiates the provisions of Article 2.2 TBT from Article XX GATT. Thus, in most of the 
cases108 the panel has to confirm ‘necessity’ of the trade-restrictiveness by comparing the 
challenged measure with the possible alternative measure and addressing (i) whether an 
alternative measure is less trade-restrictive; (ii) whether it would make an equivalent 
contribution to the legitimate objective; (iii) whether it is reasonably available, and, finally, 
(iv) what the risks of non-fulfilment of the legitimate objective are.109 Although, as 
demonstrated, there are two elements of necessity, all of the above-mentioned factors shall be 
considered and constitute a single ‘necessity’ analysis with a focus on the ‘necessity’ of trade 
restrictiveness under Article 2.2. TBT Agreement.110 
E. Scholarly Debate  
More than any other field of public international law, proportionality and necessity have 
triggered an intense doctrinal debate, comparable only to that in the field of investment 
protection. There is considerable disagreement among WTO scholars as to whether 
proportionality constitutes a general principle of WTO law. The existing opinions can be 
summarized in three different positions, which depend on the definition of proportionality 
102  Ibid, para. 445. 
103  US – Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R (2 September 2011), paras. 7.353-7.369. 
104  References to Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, China-Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products as well as to Art. 5.6 SPS Agreement, in US – Tuna II (Mexico)(PR), paras. 7.457-7.458, 
7.471; U.S. – COOL (ABR), para. 374. 
105  US – Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, paras. 7.356-7.418.  
106  U.S. – COOL (ABR), para. 468. 
107  U.S. – COOL (ABR), para. 338. 
108  An analysis of the alternative measure is not necessary if the alternative measure is not restrictive, or if 
the challenged measure does not contribute to the achievement of the legitimate objective. See: US – 
Tuna II (Mexico), WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012), fn. 647, para. 322. 
109  U.S. – COOL, para. 461; US – Tuna II (Mexico)(ABR), paras. 312-322. In 2008, Mitchell was already 
suggesting that Article 2.2 TBT Agreement may incorporate a proportionality stricto sensu test, whereas 
even the least trade-restrictive measure can violate the TBT Agreement if it is disproportional – see: A. 
D. Mitchell (2008), supra note 45, at 202. 
110  U.S. – Tuna II (Mexico)(ABR), para. 322 (‘the evaluation involves a number of factors’); U.S. – COOL 
(ABR), para. 455. 
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applied. Firstly, Hilf and Frank consider that proportionality is an underlying, general 
principle of WTO law, which ‘helps to explain the evaluation of infringements of, or of 
exceptions to, WTO objectives, rules or disciplines’.111 According to Hilf, it essentially 
amounts to balancing competing rights.112 The author emphasizes that a ‘sensitive balancing 
process, guided by the principle of proportionality is needed in which no rule or principle 
involved should be left to redundancy or inutility. The principle of proportionality should 
govern any process of interpretation and application of WTO law with a view to obtaining a 
due relation between the different interests at stake’.113 
The second group of scholars argues that in limited cases, proportionality does indeed exist in 
WTO law, however, exactly where and to what extent remains disputed even among the 
scholars themselves.114 
A third group refutes the principle of proportionality in WTO law and limits any balancing of 
rights and duties to the necessity test as established by the panel in Korea-Beef,115 which 
essentially establishes a three-step test of a least-trade restrictive measure. This group is the 
largest to date and bases its considerations on the fact that the panel is merely an organ which 
applies the treaty-texts and does not have any role in creating WTO rules.116 Jan Neumann 
and Elisabeth Türk argue that the WTO is not institutionally ready for a fundamental and 
systematic balancing of values and interests.117 Such balancing, however, is at the centre of 
the predominant proportionality analysis. A rather radical position is taken by Regan, as he 
refutes not only the application of the principle of proportionality under WTO law, but also 
the cost-benefit analysis: 
[The] word ‘necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article 
XIV suggests a less-restrictive alternative approach much more 
naturally than it suggests a cost-benefit balancing approach. 
Furthermore, […] cost-benefit balancing is incompatible with 
the principle that Members get to choose their own level of 
protection. […] None of these limitations requires cost-benefit 
balancing, and there is nothing else in the texts to suggest that 
the dispute system is authorized to subject measures to cost-
benefit balancing. Judicial review by cost-benefit balancing is 
not in the spirit of the WTO.118 
There are various reasons for the disagreement among WTO lawyers concerning the role of 
proportionality in WTO law. As many of the accepted general principles of WTO law are also 
found in legal systems outside the WTO system, references to legal principles could be based 
111  See M. Hilf, ‘Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?’, Journal of 
International Economic Law, vol. 4, no. 1, (2001), 111-130; T. M. Franck (2010) supra note 2. 
112  Ibid., at 120. 
113  Ibid., at 130. 
114  See A. D. Mitchell (2007), supra note 48; A. Desmedt (2001), supra note 49, 441-480; M. Andenas and 
S. Zleptnig‚ (2007), supra note 44, 371-427; J. Neumann and E. Türk, ‘Necessity Revisited: 
Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law After Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – 
Sardines’, Journal of World Trade, vol. 37, no. 1, (2003), 199-233. 
115  Korea-Beef, supra note 66. 
116  See S. Thomas (2009), supra note 68, at 42-49; B. McGrady, ‘Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: 
Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative Regulatory Measures’, Journal of International 
Economic Law, vol. 12, no. 1, (2008), at 153-173. 
117  J. Neumann and E. Türk (2003), supra note 114, at 231-233. 
118  D. H. Regan (2007), supra note 79, at 366. 
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on the treaty-texts, but also based on sources of law outside the WTO system. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether, through application of a certain principle not explicitly mentioned in the text, 
the Appellate Body confirms that such a principle underlies WTO law or whether it is merely 
citing sources outside WTO law.119 This could be one of the doctrinal reasons for the 
disagreement among WTO lawyers on the relevance of the principle of proportionality in 
WTO law. Another more normative reason might be that WTO lawyers are concerned much 
less with the actual application of proportionality in WTO law than they are about the 
institutional consequences of general acceptance of proportionality as a principle in WTO 
law. They believe that the WTO is institutionally not ready for such a fundamental balancing 
of rights and interests.120 Gabrielle Marceau and Joel Trachtman argue that, on the one hand, 
balancing tests ‘seem to some to accord too much power to courts’.121 On the other hand, 
balancing tests seem to ‘intervene too greatly in national regulatory autonomy’.122 This lies at 
the heart of the problem.123  
In conclusion, proportionality in WTO law is well-established in terms of necessity, i.e. the 
ability of less intrusive measures to contribute to the achievement of a particular aim, while 
additional tests of proportionality in terms of balancing and weighing different interests in 
assessing policy goals adopted by governments and the suitability of the measures adopted 
has remained controversial. The TBT and SPS Agreements go a step further than the other 
WTO agreements and establish positive normative standards to assess proportionality. The 
most recent jurisprudence on the TBT Agreement has built on the experience from the GATT, 
GATS and SPS Agreements, including the cost-benefit balancing, and offered the most 
comprehensive approach to the analysis of necessity in the WTO framework so far. 
V.  Proportionality in Investment Law  
As a result of the negotiation of a patchy but extensive framework of international investment 
agreements (IIAs) worldwide, and more recently, the escalation in the use of investor–state 
arbitration procedures included in IIAs, investment has become one of the most prolific areas 
of international economic law and potentially of the proportionality doctrine. The application 
of IIAs, and treaty-based litigation in particular, has revealed a fundamental tension arising 
between two competing objectives. On the one hand are the various protection guarantees that 
IIAs seek to provide to foreign investors, and on the other, the regulatory powers that host 
States can and should exercise in pursuit of legitimate public policies. It is in the context of 
this intrinsic tension generated at the core of the application of certain provisions of IIAs that 
the principle of proportionality acquires its relevance. 
119  M. Hilf (2001), supra note 111, at 121. 
120  M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig (2007), supra note 44, at 373. 
121  G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, ‘The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ Journal of World 
Trade 36(5), (2002), 811-881, at 850-851. 
122  Ibid. 
123  For an in-depth analysis of standards of review and therefore of the deliberate allocation of vertical 
powers between WTO adjudicating bodies and national authorities see e.g. M. Oesch, Standards of 
Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. 
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A. Increasing Relevance  
Over the last two decades of practice in treaty-based investor–State disputes, the use of the 
proportionality principle as an analytical tool to interpret IIAs has been somewhat limited. 
This stems not only from the limited number of arbitration tribunals which have explicitly 
applied the principle, but also, from its timid invocation. Among those few tribunals which 
have explicitly invoked the proportionality principle in their analysis, very few have followed 
the rigorous step-by-step analytical procedure developed by the jurisprudence of various 
domestic and international courts.124 
However, an overview of the evolution of investor–State arbitration case law shows that this 
is gradually changing. Arbitration tribunals are beginning to apply proportionality analysis in 
situations where the regulatory interests of host States have to be balanced vis-à-vis certain 
investment protection guarantees provided to foreign investors in IIAs. 
In particular, the embryonic application of the principle of proportionality in the context of 
international investment law has taken place in three specific contexts. First, in the 
determination as to whether a particular regulatory measure constitutes a de facto 
expropriation. Second, whether a government action constitutes a violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard (FETS). And third, in the case of determining the correct 
applicability of clauses providing a general exception on public order and essential security 
interests – in particular, practice has focused on the application of various claims submitted by 
U.S. investors against Argentina under the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between 
Argentina and the United States. After a brief synthesis of the contents of the principle, this 
section will illustrate how investor–State arbitration tribunals have applied the proportionality 
principle in the three contexts referred to above. 
In the investment context, the application of the principle of proportionality entails a method 
of legal interpretation that is potentially suitable in situations of collisions or conflicts of 
interests of investors and of public policy objectives.125 For adjudicating disputes which 
involve conflicts between the legitimate interests of investors and competing public policy 
goals, proportionality has been considered the most appropriate analytical procedure.126 Yet, 
here as elsewhere, there are differences between the various versions and methodologies of 
proportionality analysis. They all represent a guiding structure for decision-makers in 
determining whether measures taken by public authorities have sufficiently taken into account 
the rights and interests of the subjects affected by those measures.127 However, not all aspects 
of IIAs are suitable for proportionality analysis. The following paragraphs illustrate the 
124  Doctrine and comparative law in investment protection have recognized that the proper application of 
the principle of proportionality comprises observing the three guiding sub-principles identified in 
human rights protection and originating in German administrative law discussed above, text 
accompanying note 7, that is, the principle of suitability, the principle of necessity and the principle of 
proportionality stricto sensu. See X. Han, ‘The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in 
Tecmed v. Mexico’, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 6, no. 3, (2007), pp. 635-652, at 636; B. 
Kingsbury and S. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Administrative Law, New York University Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers, New York, (2009), at 29. 
125  B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009), supra note 124, at 21. 
126  A. S. Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, Yale Law School, Faculty’s 
Scholarship Series, Paper 69, New Haven, (2010), at 2. 
127  B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009), supra note 124, at 28. 
24 
                                                 
conflicts of interest to which proportionality considerations apply, and how proportionality 
analysis has entered investment protection arbitration. 
B. Regulatory Takings 
Two types of expropriation covered by IIAs have to be distinguished: direct and indirect 
expropriations. In the case of direct expropriation (formal transfer of property rights), 
compensation is due, independent of the cause for the expropriation. In the case of indirect 
expropriation, and particularly in the case of regulatory takings, the situation is more 
complex: regulatory takings raise a conflict of interests between the regulatory interests of 
host governments and the investment protection interests of the investors.128  
It should be noted, however, that under international law, not all regulatory interferences with 
property rights constitute an expropriation, and thus have to be compensated. In this regard, 
the Iran US Tribunal (IUSCTR) held in SEDCO129 that: 
[i]t is also an accepted principle of international law that a State 
is not liable for economic injury which is a consequence of bona 
fide ‘regulation’ within the accepted police power of states.130 
On the other hand, both doctrine and investment arbitration practice have considered that in 
certain circumstances, public regulation may lead to de facto expropriations. The NAFTA 
Tribunal in SD Myers,131 for example, stated in a case concerning temporary export 
provisions of dangerous waste: 
[t]he general body of precedent usually does not treat regulatory 
action as amounting to expropriation. Regulatory conduct by 
public authorities is unlikely to be subject of legitimate 
complaint under Article 1110 [the norm regulating 
expropriations] of the NAFTA, although the Tribunal does not 
rule out that possibility.132 
Thus, two doctrines dominate the jurisprudence of international arbitral tribunals on indirect 
takings: the ‘sole-effects’ doctrine under which the sole determining factor in deciding 
whether an indirect expropriation has occurred is the effect of the governmental measure on 
the investment. And the ‘police-powers’ doctrine, under which a range of other factors such 
as the purpose and context of the measure, the character of the measure and the interference in 
legitimate expectations of the investor, are considered.133 
In Tecmed,134 an investment arbitration tribunal explicitly invoked the proportionality 
principle for the first time, leading to a combination of the two doctrines. The tribunal 
128  U. Kriebaum, ‘Privatising Human Rights: The Interface between International Investment Protection 
and Human Rights’, in: A. Reinisch and U. Kriebaum (eds.), The Law of International Relations – Liber 
Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhaus, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, (2007)‚165-189, at 178. 
129  SEDCO Inc. v. NIOC, Award, 24 October 1985, 9 IUSCTR 249. 
130  SEDCO, supra note 129, at 275. 
131  SD Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada. Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 40 ILM (2001) 1408. 
132  SD Myers, supra note 131 para. 281. 
133  U. Kriebaum (2007) supra note 128, at 180; B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009) supra note 124, at 32. 
134  Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 May 2003, 43 ILM 
133 (2004). 
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attributed considerable weight to the effects of the measure, but also pondered additional 
factors when deciding whether a de facto expropriation had taken place. In Tecmed, the 
authorities had refused to renew an operating permit for a waste landfill. The ICSID Tribunal 
found that this failure constituted an expropriation. It also held that limitations on the use and 
enjoyment of benefits related to the property of permanent nature based on their actual effect 
can amount to a deprivation of such property, whereas the intention of the government is not 
decisive. Following the examination of the impact of the measure upon the investment, the 
Tribunal assessed whether the impact of the interference was proportional to the aim of the 
measure and to the investment protection granted.135 The determination as to whether the 
facts corresponded to a de facto expropriation was based on a two-step analysis. First, the 
tribunal determined whether the state’s measure itself was sufficiently intense for a non-
compensable regulation to turn into a compensable indirect expropriation. In this regard, it 
found that the waste disposal facility could not be used for a different purpose and could not 
be sold because of the pollution of the property. In a second step, the tribunal considered the 
effects of the non-renewal of the licence as only one factor among other aspects like the 
legitimate expectations of the investor, the importance of the regulatory interest pursued by 
the host state, the weight and the effect of the restriction, and other circumstances.136 The 
Tribunal ultimately found that the measure was not proportional.  
With the inclusion of the assessment of proportionality, Tecmed was the first instance where a 
treaty-based investment arbitration explicitly mentioned the principle of proportionality. The 
proportionality test was applied to find out whether an expropriation had in fact taken place or 
not. A similar approach was later adopted in LG&E and in a few other cases.137 However, the 
proportionality principle has still not become widely used by investment arbitration tribunals 
in the determination of de facto expropriations. 
C. Application of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
One of the most frequently invoked standards of protection in investor–State arbitration is the 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard (FETS). Such a standard, which is often worded in 
very vague terms, basically provides the investor with an absolute standard of protection 
separate from the host country domestic legislation. It does not entail an obligation of result, 
but rather an obligation of conduct on the part of the host government when implementing its 
administrative or legislative measures, which may affect the foreign investors. Due process, 
transparency, stability in the regulatory framework and the protection of the investor’s 
legitimate expectations, constitute the main elements that investment arbitration has ascribed 
to the FETS. Within this context, the FETS often leads to situations where the proportionality 
principle can be useful to balance tensions between an investor’s rights and a state’s 
legitimate interest in regulating for the public good.138 
FETS is particularly relevant for the protection of the investor’s legitimate expectations. 
Because not every change of the domestic legal framework can result in the state’s obligation 
135  Ibid., para. 122, footnotes omitted. 
136  B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009), supra note 124, at 33-5. 
137  LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1), Award of 25 July 2007. See on proportionality analysis in the cases of indirect 
expropriation: C. Henckels, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting 
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration’, Journal of 
International Economic Law, vol. 15, no. 1, (2012), 223-255. 
138  A. S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 13-14. 
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to pay the investor compensation, a test is needed for balancing the different interests at stake. 
In Saluka,139 the tribunal warned about taking the idea of investor’s expectations too literally, 
as this would impose unrealistic obligations upon states.140 The tribunal set out to balance the 
interests of the investor and the interests of the state within a broader proportionality test; 
No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made remain totally 
unchanged. … The determination of a breach of Article 3.1 by 
the Czech Republic therefore requires a weighing of the 
Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the one 
hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the 
other. A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in any 
case properly expect that the Czech Republic implements its 
policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it affects the 
investor’s investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies 
and that such conduct does not manifestly violate requirements 
of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and non-
discrimination. In particular, any differential treatment of a 
foreign investor must not be based on unreasonable distinctions 
and demands, and must be justified by showing that it bears a 
reasonable relationship to rational policies not motivated by a 
preference for other investments over the foreign-owned 
investment.141 
This approach has been endorsed by various other tribunals.142 Tribunals increasingly also 
link proportionality with concepts of reasonableness. The cases of Pope & Talbot143 and 
Eureko144 both imported a general concept of reasonableness into specific interpretations and 
applications of FETS. On the other hand, proportionality-related analysis can also be relevant 
in establishing whether the exercise of administrative discretion conforms to FETS.145 In 
Middle East Cement,146 a key question was whether the procedural implementation of an 
auction was valid, particularly, whether sufficient notice of the seizure of the auctioned ship 
was given. Relying on the FETS in interpreting the due process requirement in the 
expropriation provision of the Greece–Egypt BIT, the tribunal reasoned that a direct 
communication on such an important matter would be necessary whether or not there is a 
respective obligation or commercial practice.147 Kingsbury and Schill state in this context, 
that, without formulating it explicitly, a proportionality analysis was applied by weighing the 
139  Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award of 17 
March 2006. 
140  Saluka, supra note 139, para. 305. 
141  Ibid., paras. 305 et seq. 
142  See BG Group Plc. v. The Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL Final Award of 27 December 2007, 
para. 298; or Marvin Feldman v. Mexico (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1), Award of 16 December 
2002, para. 111. 
143  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Interim Award of 26 June 2000 (Media Copy), 
para. 68. 
144  Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award of 19 August 2005, para. 233. 
145  See B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009), supra note 124, at 38. 
146  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co SA v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/6), Award of 12 April 2002. 
147  ME Cement, supra note 146, para. 143. 
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importance of investment protection, the legitimate government interest pursued, and the fact 
that less restrictive but equally efficient options were available.148 
D. General Exceptions on Public Order and Essential Security Interests 
Another context in which the embryonic application of the principle of proportionality has 
taken place is in the determination of the correct invocation of clauses providing general 
public order or essential security exceptions in IIAs. The 1990s in Argentina were marked by 
deep market-oriented reforms, leading to a significant influx of foreign investment. In the 
early stages the negotiation of contracts occurred with extensive involvement of public 
authorities in a number of sectors, including utilities. The Argentinean Peso was pegged to the 
U.S. dollar to ensure economic stability in the country. During the years 1999–2002 the 
Argentinean economy suffered from a major economic meltdown, which resulted among 
other things in the devaluation of the currency. This in turn led to the devaluation of 
investments based on the initial exchange rate. The modification of the regulatory regime 
resulted in a wave of claims submitted to investor–State arbitration by U.S. and European 
investors under their respective BITs.149 
The BIT between Argentina and the United States, includes Article XI which reads as 
follows: 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of 
measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the 
fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of 
its own essential security interests.150 
Consequently, if measures undertaken by the Argentinean Government during the crisis meet 
the requirements outlined in Article XI, they do not breach rights provided to investors in 
other parts of the BIT. Thus, not surprisingly, in many cases, Argentina invoked Article XI as 
a defence against the claims submitted by foreign investors. 
Arbitration tribunals have been quite inconsistent in their approaches towards evaluating the 
question of the legitimacy of measures necessary for the preservation of public order and 
security. Sweet argues that the proportionality test would be the best-practice standard for 
dealing with normative conflicts like the ones posed by a clause like this.151 However, 
arbitration tribunals have tended to ignore proportionality. Among several awards CMS152 
(May 2005), Enron153 (May 2007), LG&E154 (July 2007), Sempra155 (September 2007), and 
148  B. Kingsbury and S. Schill (2009), supra note 124, at 39. 
149  A. S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 19-20. 
150  Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment (entered into force 20 October 1994). 
151  A. S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 2. 
152  CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Award of 
12 May 2005. 
153  Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3), Award 
of 22 May 2007. 
154  LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. AEB/01/1), Award of 25 July 2007. 
155  Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16), Award of 28 
September 2007. 
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Continental Casualty156 (September 2008), only the last undertook an explicit application of 
proportionality analysis. In Continental Casualty,157 the tribunal accepted the plea of 
Argentina under Article XI of the BIT and adopted a mature form of proportionality analysis. 
The proportionality test applied was the one developed by the GATT panels and the Appellate 
Body for dealing with derogations to the GATT permitted under Article XX of that 
agreement.158 
The tribunal began with establishing whether Article XI was applicable to the dispute. It ruled 
that significant economic and social difficulties may also require governmental actions to 
restore civil peace and the normal life of society, which correspondingly will fall under 
Article XI.159 The tribunal itself then adopted the standards and methodology used by WTO to 
adjudicate the necessity plea under Article XX GATT. The tribunal quoted the classic case 
Korea-Beef160 and stated that it is well-established that ‘necessary’ refers more to an 
‘indispensable’ measure than to a measure ‘making a contribution’.161 The tribunal finally 
turned to the analysis of necessity itself and quoted extensively from what today is a leading 
WTO case, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres discussed above in part IV.B.3: 
The necessity of a measure should be determined through ‘a 
process of weighing and balancing of factors’ which usually 
includes the assessment of the following three factors: the 
relative importance of interests or values furthered by the 
challenged measures, the contribution of the measure to the 
realization of the ends pursued by it and the restrictive impact of 
the measure on international commerce.162 
The tribunal then assessed the state measures under review with regard to a long list of 
alternatives. With one minor exception, the tribunal found that Article XI indeed covered 
Argentina’s measures. In January 2009, Continental Casualty asked that an annulment 
committee be constituted.163  
Through the Continental Casualty decision, proportionality has made a significant entrance 
into treaty-based investment arbitration. As the necessity defence is likely to become a regular 
feature of investor–State arbitration (particularly in times of economic and financial crisis), 
tribunals are likely to further embrace the proportionality framework in the future. At the 
same time, it is likely to attract criticism similar to that in the debate on WTO law addressing 
the balance of powers between government and international courts of arbitration in 
reviewing governmental policies. Indeed, Sweet, and others, suggest that this explains the 
earlier reluctance to engage in proportionality in former cases:  
To adopt proportionality-style necessity analysis would place 
arbitrators in the position of the balancing judge as perhaps 
156  Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9), Award of 5 
September 2008. 
157  A. S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 22. 
158  Ibid., at 23. 
159  Continental Casualty, supra note 156, para. 174. 
160  Korea-Beef, supra note 66.  
161  Ibid., para. 161 reprinted in Continental Casualty, supra note 156, para. 193. 
162  Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, supra note 84, para. 164 reprinted in Continental Casualty, supra note 156, 
para. 194. 
163  S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 24. 
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something quite different than arbitrators traditionally 
conceived.164 
Despite such concerns, a growing sector of the doctrine has started to advocate the use of 
proportionality analysis as a potential instrument not only to foster the development of sound 
international investment law jurisprudence, but also to deal with the eroding legitimacy of the 
international investment regime resulting from an inconsistent case law based on not always 
clear and sophisticated legal reasoning. Kingsbury and Schill argue that proportionality 
analysis seems to be more rational and profound than the ‘“I-know-it-when-I-see-it” type of 
reasoning’, thus improving the accountability of arbitrators. Moreover, it allows the non-
investment-related interests of the third parties that will be affected by the decision to be taken 
into account.165 
In conclusion, proportionality in investment protection increasingly attempts to balance the 
different and competing legitimate interests involved; this is comparable to the methodology 
and problems developed in WTO law. It particularly interesting that the protection of 
legitimate expectations – an emanation of good faith – is discussed in terms of proportionality 
and balancing rights and obligations.  
VI. Assessment and Conclusions  
Proportionality in international law appears in different forms and contexts. While it plays a 
crucial role in the protection of human rights, adopting constitutional doctrines and often a 
three-tier test, other fields use the principle in a less sophisticated and sometimes obscure 
manner. It is interesting to note that proportionality finds its roots in the law of reprisals and 
in maritime boundary delimitation in the principle of equity. The former aimed at limiting 
reprisals to what is required to achieve particular goals, thus adopting the tests of necessity in 
view of an unchallenged governmental policy. In maritime boundary delimitation, the 
principle of equity led to application of weighing and balancing of factors, rather than of a 
strict equidistance rule. Subsequent case law develops proportionality into an ex post test 
assessing potential disproportionality in the correlation of coastal lengths and marine spaces 
allocated. The normative role of the principle in such constellations comes close to avoiding 
abuse of rights through disproportionate allocations of resources, while leaving States ample 
leeway in their operations. This seems equally true for other purely horizontal relations, 
particularly relating to the use of force and reprisals. Limiting proportionality to a requirement 
to avoid disproportionate reactions, or reactions out of proportion, implies a limitation of 
judicial review and of standards of review of acts of States. 
The much more stringent role of proportionality in human rights protection, however, 
indicates that the principle assumes a more active part in legal relations which mainly affect 
private operators. The same is true in WTO law. While reluctant to openly refer to 
proportionality as a general principle of WTO law, perhaps even international law, panels and 
the Appellate Body mainly operate proportionality within the concept of necessity. The 
obligation to show and prove less stringent measures by the complaining party is at the heart 
of the test. Yet, different forms of proportionality exist within WTO law and may even gain 
weight in the future as judiciary continues to establish tests of balancing and weighing in the 
164  A. S. Sweet (2010), supra note 126, at 22. 
165  Ibid., at 40. 
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sense of proportionality stricto sensu. Proportionality may influence the interpretation of 
specific provisions in WTO law, and pose less of a danger to WTO Members pursuing 
legitimate policy choices than some other, vaguely defined tests would. But there is 
considerable concern about the question whether the WTO judiciary should be balancing at 
all. While some believe that the WTO will eventually develop its own form of proportionality 
test (because it is unavoidable to have a proportionality test established in a law which 
embodies conflicts of interest), others urge the WTO DSB to abandon balancing (because the 
DSB is not entitled to do so and the WTO system is not yet sufficiently democratic). The 
problem is similar in investment protection. Operators enjoy the right to investor–State 
arbitration, and tribunals are called upon to assess rights and obligations of States and private 
parties directly. Investment dispute settlement is opening up towards a more active role of 
proportionality and potentially a three-tier test developed in administrative law and human 
rights protection.166 The restrictions imposed upon the investors in pursuit of legitimate policy 
goals may be assessed using a three-tier approach. 
These findings may essentially have two explanations. 
Firstly, proportionality was not firmly anchored in Anglo-American and Anglo-Saxon law – 
the two legal cultures which have had the strongest influence in public international law since 
World War II. It is not a coincidence that authors sceptical about proportionality often have a 
common law background. Doctrines of necessity and of reasonableness assume comparable, 
but not identical functions. It is only more recently, and mainly through international law, that 
the principle has been discussed and we witness its gradual acceptance. 
Secondly, and perhaps more important, traditional public international law structurally dealt 
with horizontal relations between States while proportionality originates in vertical relations 
between authorities and individuals and what was called the law of police (Polizeirecht). 
Policing states was not originally a task of international law. It was limited to co-ordinating 
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. The advent of human rights protection, as well as 
protection of market access, non-discrimination and investment in international economic 
law, have introduced elements of vertical relations to the extent that states, in their horizontal 
relations, have increasingly addressed issues concerning vertical relations of States and 
foreign individuals, both humans and corporations. It results in mixed constellations of both 
horizontal and vertical relations. This evolution rendered the principle of proportionality 
suitable in specific areas of international law. At the same time, it remains controversial 
because these relations continue to entail horizontal relations where respect for policy space 
and sovereignty has been of paramount importance in the Westphalian system of nation states 
and proportionality is limited to assessing the relationship of ends and means. It is no 
coincidence that the scope and outreach of proportionality in WTO law and investment law 
has remained controversial and partly obscure as it entails increasing encroachment of and 
review of government policies affecting market access and foreign direct investment. It is also 
no coincidence that these issues mainly appear in areas which are subject to dispute resolution 
which is no longer subject to ad hoc agreements and consent of States concerned.  
WTO law is of particular importance in assessing proportionality both in horizontal and 
vertical relations because it is subject to mandatory dispute settlement and enforcement. 
Panels and the Appellate Body are called upon to assess whether state conduct amounts to 
nullification and impairment of benefits under the DSU, a task mainly consisting of assessing 
166  In the future this trend may well spread to the areas of prevention and conciliation. 
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the legality of trade-related measures. The role of proportionality is therefore closely linked to 
rules and principles of treaty interpretation, standards of review and, more broadly, the 
position and role of judicial dispute settlement within the multilateral trading system. The 
agreement stipulates that ‘recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements’.167 
Panels and the Appellate Body have consistently interpreted the text of the agreements 
primarily ‘in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty’.168 Panels and 
the Appellate Body follow the customary rules of treaty interpretation embodied in Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Practice is characterized by strong 
adherence to textual and contextual interpretation.169 They seek to refrain from judicial 
activism. Thus, in possibly applying proportionality and thus in weighing different rights and 
interests, panels and the Appellate Body are careful not to alter existing rights and obligations 
under the WTO Agreements. This framework sets the stage for the potential operation of 
proportionality in trade regulation: it is inherently linked to the powers and functions of 
panels and the Appellate Body. Extensive or restrictive recourse to proportionality directly 
affects and defines such powers in assessing governmental action. The same is true for 
bilateral investment dispute settlement under BITs, in particular private actor v. state 
arbitration. Governments are equally obliged to engage in dispute settlement and legitimacy 
and compliance largely depends whether the ruling remains in line with the text and purpose 
of the agreement in accordance with the principles of treaty interpretation.  
The reluctance to embrace the language and rhetoric of proportionality, in the absence of 
positive law, may in substance be founded in the concern that proportionality, applying 
predominant doctrines, results in overall weighing and balancing, which in the end will erode 
market access and non-discrimination and give way to almost any competing government 
policy. The same is true for the risk of eroding investment protection and of human rights. 
Proportionality is a principle of great value and assistance. But it does not and cannot 
dispense with making value-based judgments one way or the other, and who should be 
entitled to make these judgments? Foremost, the problem of proportionality is a matter of 
defining the proper role of courts in a system of multilevel governance and of vertical checks 
and balances.  
Indeed, at the heart of these debates is the quest for the proper role and power of international 
courts of law and arbitration. It should be recalled that the full principle of proportionality 
originates in domestic law assuming powerful constitutional courts entitled to review 
governmental policies. International courts are more restrained in doing so. The review of 
horizontal applications of proportionality shows a clear restriction to necessity or ex-post 
assessment of reasonableness. Likewise, review of necessity in terms of defining appropriate 
means to end relations is well established. More extended review has remained controversial, 
both in trade and investment, albeit courts are gradually moving towards more broadly 
defined operations of balancing interests and thus proportionality stricto sensu.  
It should be recalled that this problem of judicial review is not limited to international law, but 
is of general nature. Constitutional law in federal states shows similar problems of defining 
how to review value judgments. While the three-tier test originating in administrative law 
167  Article 3.2 and Article 19.2 of the DSU. 
168  See e.g. P. Van den Bossche, From Afterthought to Centerpiece: The WTO Appellate Body and its Rise 
to Prominence in the World Trading System, Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2005/1, 
Maastricht, (2005). 
169  See also A. Desmedt (2001), supra note 46, at 442. 
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leaves this task to courts, more federalist approaches leave the assessment of public interests 
to political bodies and the democratic process, limiting proportionality to assessing the 
relationship of ends and means. This is typically the case in Swiss constitutional law.170 The 
point is that a doctrine of multilevel governance is warranted not only in international law, but 
also in domestic law rendering governance more coherent overall.171  
Perhaps the most important insights relate to legal methodology. Similar to equity, the 
principle of proportionality does not entail a mechanical application of norms and rules, but 
seeks reasonable and fair results by taking recourse to factors and criteria which are identified 
in a particular context and brought to mutual bearing and relations. It is on the basis of such 
factors of real life that necessity can be assessed, or whenever the law allows for it, weighing 
and balancing of different factors and identified values are undertaken. Proportionality stands 
for a particular method of jurisprudence which can be shared on all layers of governance, 
including international law. 
Given the increasing role of proportionality as a legal principle in different legal orders, it 
amounts to a legal principle recognized in international law under Article 38 of the Statute of 
the ICJ, essentially derived from the tradition of equity. A common denominator identified in 
all areas of international law examined relates to the requirements for a reasonable 
relationship between ends and means. Measures employed should not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the goal set. Proportionality in terms of necessity, reasonable 
relationship between end and means and exclusion of excessive measures qualifies as a 
general principle of law applicable in international law, both in horizontal and vertical 
relations. Beyond that, however, the principle assumes different regulatory functions in 
different contexts, and recognition of proportionality as a principle of law and thus of 
international law will not bring about uniform and simplified applications beyond the 
common trait of necessity. There is no common ground to adopt proportionality stricto sensu 
as an implied requirement to balance and weigh interests involved as a general principle of 
law. This is particularly true where the principle seeks to assess underlying values or choices 
and thus is linked to more extended powers of the judiciary. The controversies in WTO law 
and inherent tensions with positive law offer a pertinent example showing that generalizations 
cannot be made. It cannot be simply a matter of applying a three-tier principle of 
proportionality, which was developed in a particular constitutional context and system of 
separation and balances of power which is not identical to the one found in international law. 
The foundation will, however, allow proportionality to develop its role and function in 
170  See BGE 2C. 485/2010 (Glarner Sach Insurance). 
171  See e.g. T. Cottier et al., ‘Introduction: Fragmentation and Coherence in International Trade Regulation: 
Analysis and Conceptual Foundations’, in: T. Cottier and P. Delimatsis (eds.), The Prospects of 
International Trade Regulation: From Fragmentation to Coherence, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, (2011), 1-65, at 33 et seq.; T. Cottier, ‘The Impact from Without: International Law and the 
Structure of Federal Governance in Switzerland’, in T. Cottier, P. Knoepfel and W. Linder (eds.), 
Verwaltung, Regierung und Verfassung im Wandel: Gedächtnisschrift für Raimund E. Germann, 
Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Basel, (2000), 213-230; T. Cottier and M. Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st 
Century Constitutionalism’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden and Boston , vol. 7, no. 1, (2003), 261-322, at 299; T. Cottier, ‘The Constitutionalism of 
International Economic Law’, in K.M. Meessen et al. (eds.), Economic Law as an Economic Good . Its 
Rule Function and its Tool Function in the Competition of Systems, Sellier de Gruyter, Munich, (2009); 
T. Cottier, ‘Konstitutionalisierungsprobleme im internationalen Wirtschaftsrecht: verfassungsrechtliche 
Herausforderungen im Rahmen der WTO’, Recht, Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung und Praxis, 
Sonderheft: Die Öffnung des Verfassungsrechts. Symposium zum 65. Geburtstag von Prof. Jörg Paul 
Müller, (2005), 50-62, at 51-52. 
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different aspects of international law, responding, ultimately, to the rules of reasonableness 
and fairness. 
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